Rather then whole passage here are some interesting snips from the article,
– On most psychological measures, such as how men and women process information, how we communicate, even how we feel about ourselves, we are actually quite alike. In short, it turns out we are all from Earth.
– Human nature also plays a role. We have a huge tendency to categorize each other as a way of making sense of the world, Hyde said. We place people into boxes: male/female, black/white, gay/straight. Then we make them stay there.
– She merged 46 studies conducted over 20 years in areas such as math problem-solving, verbal and abstract reasoning, talkativeness, leadership effectiveness, sexual satisfaction, depression and happiness. She found that 78 percent of the time, the differences in scores between men and women were “close to zero” or “small.”
– Children, too, suffer. Girls are still fighting to correct the myth that they are less competent at math, which cheats them of greater challenges and career choices. Boys, on the other hand, suffer from lack of self-esteem in equal measure to girls.
I read part of the book Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus( thank goodness for bookstore cafes, I’d never pay for books like that) and thought that it just perpetuated old myths dressed up in modern terms. Terms that were digestible enough that that phrase – Men are from Mars has become part of the national cliche library. Maybe this new study just plays into my prejudices, but it sounds more like what I observe.
Iraq dominates the list of Rumsfeld errors because of the sheer enormity of his strategic mistakes. Indeed, his Iraq blunders should have cost him his job long before the 2006 midterm elections. From tinkering with troop deployments in 2002 and 2003, which ensured there were too few troops from the start, to micromanaging operations with his famed “8,000 mile screwdriver,” to pushing for the disastrous twin policies of de-Baathification and disbandment for the Iraqi army, Rumsfeld’s failures transformed the Iraq war from a difficult enterprise into an unwinnable one. Likewise, in Afghanistan, missteps by the Pentagon have left America’s victory there unconsummated. Make no mistake: These were not tactical failures, made by subordinate military officers. Rather, these were strategic errors of epic proportions that no amount of good soldiering could undo. Blame for these strategic missteps lies properly with the secretary of defense and his senior generals, and, ultimately, with the White House.
I’m glad that Phil Carter, who wrote this piece and writes a lot about miltary issues and history sees Rummy’s failures within the context of his position as subordinate to a Whitehouse that could have changed course, chose a better war manager or a better set of strategies, but choose not to.